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ARGUMENT
The Serratos urge this Court to adopt a standard for extending the time within
which to initiate an appeal which would effectively delete the "excusable neglect"
requirement from the rule in favor of a more liberal "good cause" standard. Such a loose
interpretation would have the practical effect of converting a 30-day deadline into a 60-day
limitation. The Supreme Court recently rejected such an approach in Reisbeck v. HCA
Health Services of Utah. Inc.. 2000 UT 48, 2 P.3d 447. This Court should also
respectfully decline the invitation to do so.
It is instructive to keep two overriding themes firmly in mind in evaluating whether
the trial court abused its discretion in granting the Serratos an extension of time within
which to commence their appeal. First, the Serratos made no showing of excusable neglect
or good cause for the extension. The Serratos' counsel candidly acknowledges receipt of a
"Notice of Entry of Summary Judgment and Order of Dismissal" under Rule 58A(d) of the
Utah Rules of Procedure on or about September 1, 1999, a full 26 days before the notice of
appeal should have been filed on Monday, September 27, 1999.l Furthermore, their
counsel also acknowledges it was "clearly a mistake" on his part in "misreading" and making
"an erroneous interpretation" of the Notice of Entry of Judgment and Order of Dismissal.2

Combined Reply Brief and brief of cross-appellees, pp. 4-5.
2

Combined Reply Brief and brief of cross-appellees, pp. 10-11.

Second, the trial court granted Serratos3 motion without oral argument and failed to
make any findings or specify a basis for determining the existence of good cause or
excusable neglect.
Despite the Serratos attempt to distinguish and isolate the decision in Prowswood,
Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supp. Co.? 676 P.2d 952 (Utah 1984), the fundamental proposition
for which UTA has cited the Prowswood decision is neither outdated nor misplaced. In
Salt Lake Knee &: Sports Rehab.. Inc. v. Salt Lake City Knee &: Sports Medicine, 909 P.2d
266, 268 (Utah App. 1995) and Hausknect v. Industrial Common. 882 P.2d 683, 684
(Utah App. 1994) this Court cited Prowswood for the proposition that "it is axiomatic in
this jurisdiction that failure to timely perfect an appeal is a jurisdictional failure requiring
dismissal of the appeal." More recently this Court in Dipoma v. McPhie? 2000 Utah Ct.
App. 130,1110, 1 P.3d 564, 567 cited Prowswood along with other cases as being
"instructive in their reasoning" on the issue of perfecting an appeal.
Serratos further argue that the granting of a motion under Rule 4(e) Utah R.App.P.
should not be limited to unique or extraordinary circumstances. Without that limitation,
however, the time prescribed in Rule 4(a) becomes only a nominal barrier to appeal, easily
overcome by filing a motion to extend the deadline under even the flimsiest of
circumstances. In lieu of the higher standard, Serratos suggest that "good cause" under
Rule 4(e) imposes a lesser burden than "excusable neglect," thereby "softening" the effect of
the time limits imposed under Rule 4(a). They then argue that the "excusable neglect53
standard should be broadly construed to make virtually any mistake or neglect "excusable"
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in the absence of a showing of demonstrable prejudice on the part of an opposing party,
impliedly shifting the entire burden under the rule.
In Murphy v. Crosland. 915 P.2d 491, 494 (Utah 1996), the Supreme Court held
that the "good cause" standard under Rule 4(e) could be applied after as well as before the
expiration of the 30-day period provided in Rule 4(a). In light of that ruling, the question
becomes whether a finding of "good cause" as an alternative to "excusable neglect" requires
a lesser showing. If so, the requirement to demonstrate excusable neglect becomes
meaningless because all parties seeking an extension of time would simply pursue a
determination of the existence of good cause, an approach firmly rejected by the Supreme
Court in Reisbeck, supra, 111112, 13. In Reisbeck, the Court emphasized the important
distinction between "excusable neglect" and "good cause," limiting the latter to
circumstances which are "genuinely beyond the moving parties3 control. . ." Id. at 1114.
However, where, as in this case, a party or their attorney concedes the existence of neglect, a
party must demonstrate that such neglect was excusable under the standards discussed
above. Id. at U15.
The rules of statutory construction require that a court read the language in such a
manner as to make all provisions relevant and meaningful and avoid any interpretation
which makes some part irrelevant, nonsensical or absurd. E.g., Perrine v. Kennecott Min.
Corp.. 911 P.2d 1290,1292 (Utah 1996). The only way to give effect to both standards,
good cause and excusable neglect, is to construe them as applying to different
circumstances.

An attorney's failure to determine from the clerk of the court when a judgment has
been entered is neglect which, by itself, is not excusable. West v. Grand Country 942 P.2d
337, 340 (Utah 1997). Because the untimely commencement of this appeal is based upon
such neglect, the trial court cannot simply find "good cause" in the alternative without first
evaluating whether the neglect was excusable. Serratos made no showing of excusable
neglect and the trial court made no finding of the existence of excusable neglect. There is
certainly no suggestion that there were special circumstances presented beyond the Serratos3
control, which is necessary in order to trigger the application of the "good cause" standard.
The extension of time under Rule 4(e) was therefore an abuse of discretion and should be
reversed.
Serratos cite West at 340-41 for factors to be considered in determining whether
there is excusable neglect. Although these factors are nonexclusive, West at 341, Serratos
argue that issues such as an attorney's experience, knowledge that the court would grant
judgment, notice of a minute entry, and notice regarding the trial court's ruling are all
irrelevant. In other words, they argue that the only circumstances a court should consider
in determining whether the neglect was excusable are those which support the finding and
all circumstances which weigh against such a finding are irrelevant. They seek a standard
which is essentially no standard at all.
The factor enunciated by the West court which is most crucial to the present matter
is whether the delay was within the reasonable control of the moving party. West at 34041. In other words, given the circumstances surrounding the trial court's entry of
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judgment, could Serratos reasonably have determined the date of entry of the judgment
against them? The answer is clearly in the affirmative.
Interestingly, Serratos choose to shift the blame for their neglect in determining the
entry date to UTA by parsing the language in the Rule 58A Notice of Entry of Judgment.
In their hair-splitting analysis of the language in that Notice, Serratos ignore the fact that
they had the independent burden to determine the date the judgment was entered. West at
340 ("Clearly, Wesfs failure to check with the clerk was neglect.") Even if they had not
received the Notice, Serratos would not have been relieved of the obligation to timely
commence their appeal. Rule 58A(d), Utah R.Civ.P. (time for filing a notice of appeal is
not affected by the notice requirement). The West court reached a similar conclusion in
applying Rule 77(d), Utah R.Civ.P. (providing that cc[l]ack of notice of the entry by the
clerk does not affect the time to appeal. . .") The mistake on the part of the Serratos3
counsel in misreading and erroneously interpreting the Notice of Entry of Judgment and
Order of Dismissal does not obviate the Serratos3 burden to verify with the trial court the
date of entry of judgment. The wording and contents of the Notice of Entry of Judgment
does not elevate that to good cause or excusable neglect.
In an attempt to make their neglect excusable, the Serratos make additional
arguments in support of the reasonableness of their actions which they did not present to
the trial court. By way of illustration, the suggestion that "It was reasonable for the
Serratos3 counsel and his staff to believe that the order was not entered the same day it was

signed."3 If Serratos5 counsel truly believed the order was not entered the same day it was
signed, is it reasonable for them not to contact the clerk to determine when the order was
entered? Not if they wished to satisfy the burden imposed upon them by law.
The issue for this Court is simple. In order for the 30-day limit on commencement
of an appeal to have any practical effect, it is necessary to impose some meaningful
standards for the trial court's exercise of discretion in extending the time for an appeal. At a
minimum, there should be an express finding of excusable neglect or good cause supported
by factual findings. More helpful would be this Court's adherence to the traditional
standard of requiring unique or extraordinary circumstances rather than the standard urged
upon the Court by Serratos.
Serratos made no showing to the trial court that their neglect was excusable as a
matter of law. Despite this, the trial court granted the Rule 4(e) motion for "good cause"
without any factual support for that conclusion and ignored the neglect involved. The trial
court abused its discretion in granting the extension of time to initiate this appeal. This
Court therefore has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and it should be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
The Serratos fail to timely commence this appeal and made no showing to justify a
finding of excusable neglect before the trial court which would justify granting an extension
of time to appeal. The trial court's decision to grant an extension of time to appeal in the

3

Serratos3 citation to Washington Fed. Sav. 8c Loan Ass'n v. Transamerica Premier
Ins. Co.? 865 P.2d 1004 (Idaho App. 1993) does not support this statement in any way.
fi

absence of any factual basis determining the existence of excusable neglect or good cause
was an abuse of discretion. This Court therefore lacks jurisdiction to entertain Serratos3
appeal because it was untimely initiated. The appeal should therefore be dismissed.
DATED this 2 5

day of August, 2000.
WILLIAMS & HUNT

By
JodyK/Bbrnet
Attorneys for Cross-Appellants
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